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In recent years, the literature has built a near consensus that “sound” 
institutions are congenial to good economic performance (North 1994).
Institutions, insofar as they determine the economic environment agents
operate in, should be important for explaining economic outcomes. Quite
often, the speciﬁc mechanism through which institutions inﬂuence eco-
nomic performance is protection from expropriation. In environments in
which expropriation is likely, agents underinvest (from a social perspective)
relative to more secure ones. In the end, a plethora of suboptimal micro-
economic decisions amount to a poorer aggregate economic performance.
Indeed, most of the empirical eﬀort in associating institutional “sound-
ness,” however deﬁned, and economic performance has been on the aggre-
gate level. An observation on a typical study is a country (La Porta et al.
[1998b] is a seminal example). Institutional measures are then linked to
economic performance on various dimensions. La Porta et al. (1998b), for
example, document that the origin of the legal system is associated with the
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tions. The usual disclaimer applies.degree of creditor protection. La Porta et al. (1997) ﬁnd that a lower degree
of creditor protection implies smaller debt and equity markets (Djankov et
al. 2003).1 Another set of articles study the ﬁnancial deepening-economic
growth link (King and Levine 1993; Levine and Zervos 1998), ﬁnding a
positive relationship. Taken all together, these papers seem to imply the fol-
lowing chain of causality. At the basic level, legal origin (institution) causes
creditor protection (protection from expropriation). At the second stage,
better creditor protection causes ﬁnancial deepening. Finally, ﬁnancial
deepening causes economic growth.
This chain of causality would be more convincing were microeconomic
evidence available. The missing link is due to the level of analysis, much
broader than the relevant locus of economic decisions. There is, for ex-
ample, an implicit assumption that agents do invest less if creditor protec-
tion is lower. For several reasons, it is hard to be completely convincing
with such an aggregate level of analysis. One such reason is reverse causal-
ity. The following example, however farfetched, is illustrative. Assume in-
vestment is completely inelastic, and creditor protection is a superior good.
Creditor protection, in this setting, has only distributive, not allocative,
eﬀects. For demand reasons, there is, however, a reverse causality running
from income to creditor protection. Evidently, investment is not com-
pletely inelastic, but the demand driven story is still conceivable. Most of
the studies do recognize this possibility, and try to ﬁnd suﬃciently exoge-
nous variation to relate institutions and economic performance. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Levine (1998) are good examples of
careful searches for such variation.
Another problem stems from the fact that legal procedures are “chosen”
by society and, hence, may be endogenously designed to tackle the issues
often put as the dependent variables in the regressions. La Porta et al.
(2004) face this diﬃculty. They argue that legal formalism reduces the qual-
ity of the judicial system. But formalism, as they recognize it, could also be
a response to “weaker law and order environment.” Their strategy is to use
the fact that most countries inherit their legal tradition (and that French
civil law is more “formalistic”), which makes the legal tradition a source of
exogenous variation. Again, the story is compelling insofar as it is prohib-
itively costly for countries to “change” their legal tradition because other-
wise “maintenance” of tradition would itself be endogenous.
However well argued (as it is the case in all papers cited), identiﬁcation
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1. Pinheiro and Cabral (1998) follow this tradition for the Brazilian credit market. Using
state-level data on outstanding volumes of credit and an index of judicial eﬃciency (based on
the results of a survey conducted with businessmen on each state where they rate the quality
of the local judiciary), they relate variation in judicial ineﬃciency to diﬀerences in outstand-
ing volumes of credit across the states. The authors conclude, corroborating the institution-
development hypothesis, that improving the eﬃciency of judicial enforcement is important
for credit markets development.is mostly a rhetorical issue as one can only test for overidentiﬁcation. With
micro level evidence, these issues can be bypassed, and one can directly 
assess how market participants respond to varying institutional environ-
ments. Creditor protection and ﬁnancial deepening is an example. If there
is evidence that creditors price judicial risk or restrain quantities in the face
of weak protection, then it becomes much more compelling that legal pro-
tection induces ﬁnancial deepening. In this case, one could be much more
conﬁdent that the causality from creditor protection to income is of ﬁrst-
order, as opposed to demand driven explanations, such as protection being
a superior good.
A third reason is omitted factors. Several other countries’ characteristics
might determine both institutional setting (such as legal origin and level 
of credit protection, the usual explanatory variables) and economic per-
formance (the usual regressand). Consider again the Acemoglu-Johnson-
Robinson strategy (2001) for ﬁnding exogenous variation in institutional
soundness to estimate the institution-economic performance link.2For for-
mer colonies, one conceivable alternative story is the type of colonization.
Suppose that, for sheer coincidence, while countries with a French civil law
tradition (usually interpreted as “unsound” institutions) occupied lands
that had valuable goods for the European market (silver in Peru and sugar
in Brazil, for instance), countries with common law tradition (“sound” in-
stitutions) arrived at places that had few “tradable” goods with Europe
(early English colonization of the United States). Suppose as well that this
trade feature determined how exploitative colonization was and that ex-
ploitation had long-lasting eﬀects. In this case, the (omitted) driving force
is whether there were comparative advantages to be explored. However,
sound institutions and (later) economic performance would still relate em-
pirically although causal interpretation would not be warranted. We do
not claim the institutional settings do not matter and that the legal tradi-
tion only enters the picture through trade “causing” both institutional set-
tings and economic performance. The crucial point is that, with micro-
level evidence, it is unnecessary to be concerned about such alternative
explanations.
Finally, measurement is intrinsically more problematic with aggregate
data. In La Porta et al. (1998), (country-level) creditor protection is mea-
sured by characteristics of the countries’ corporate laws and by several
indexes.3 Besides the inherent arbitrariness in constructing such indexes,
theory not always provides clear guidance in interpreting the results. For
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2. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) document that “better institutions” arose in
countries where mortality rates due to native diseases were low when colonizers originally ar-
rived. This, according to the authors, shifts the equation that determines institutions but not
the equation that determines current economic performance.
3. They have indexes for, among others, eﬃciency of the judicial system, risk of expropria-
tion, and risk of repudiation of contracts by government.example, is it theoretically clear that restricting the behavior of managers al-
ways increases the amount of ﬁnance in equilibrium? It is conceivable that, if
you suﬃciently restrict managers’ behavior, the size of debt and equity mar-
ket will be small, for reasons pertaining to the supply of securities? Without
a clear theoretical support, an empirical ﬁnding that restricting managers’
behavior is associated with “larger” equity, and debt markets are subject to
criticisms that micro evidence is not. One such criticism is the presence of
nonlinearities in the creditor protection-market performance relation.4
It might seem puzzling the relative lack of micro evidence on the
institution-development nexus. We conjecture that this is due to the scar-
city of a fortunate coincidence: data on both the relevant economic deci-
sion locus (ﬁrms, consumers) linked to variation on institutional settings.
La Porta et al.’s (2004) study on the formality of legal procedures and the
quality of the legal system is something of an exception.5 They do not,
however, directly associate market-level performance with diﬀerent insti-
tutional settings.
In this work, we take advantage of a particular set of events that provide
variation on a relevant institutional setting, and we are able to associate
this variation with data on the relevant economic decision locus. The
empirical setting is the market for Payroll Debit Loans in Brazil, which 
are personal loans with principal and interest payments directly deducted
from the borrowers’ payroll check. Automatic deduction from payroll, in
practice, makes a collateral out of future income. In June 2004, a high-level
federal court upheld a regional court ruling that had declared payroll de-
duction illegal.6 The decision by the federal court has a case-speciﬁc na-
ture, that is, only applies to this particular dispute. There is, however, evi-
dence from market practitioners that there was an increase in the perceived
probability that the decision could establish precedent and turn useless the
future income collateral. Using personal loans without payroll deduction
as a control group, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences procedure assesses whether
the judicial decision had an impact on market performance. Our results
suggest that the decision had an adverse impact on banks’ risk perception,
on interest rates, and on the amount lent. In this sense, this is direct evi-
dence of market participants’ reaction to institutional risk.
Our theory is simple to the point of trivial: an increase in the chance of
expropriating the collateral should shift the supply of loans inward, wors-
ening market performance. Whether the empirical consequences are ﬁrst
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4. Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) show that with incomplete markets that inter-
mediate levels of debtor punishment can induce a larger quantity of credit that extreme levels
of debtor punishment.
5. In this paper, the authors study the link between formality of the legal system and the
time elapsed to evict nonpaying tenants and to recover a bounced check. Furthermore, they
associate formality with other measures of judicial system performance, such as corruption
and access to justice.
6. The court ruled at the very end of June (28th). However, the press release was on July 1.order is far from self-evident. This is, indeed, the goal of the paper: inves-
tigate whether a clear-cut shift in the institutional setting has microeco-
nomic consequences. Evidence from market practitioners is ambiguous.
While some important players had the perception that the decision could
have strong adverse eﬀects, equally important ones thought the eﬀect
would be second order.
The market-level evidence is a complement, not a substitute, to the
aggregate-level evidence. Indeed, our results in no way contradict the liter-
ature. On the contrary, they corroborate it. While aggregate evidence indi-
cates that institutional diﬀerences are of ﬁrst-order importance in explain-
ing variation in countries’ performances, micro- and market-level evidence
evaluates directly the implicit assumption necessary to interpret the aggre-
gate evidence as indeed causal.
The result has an additional interest given the empirical application. Pay-
roll lending is one of the workhorses of the recent Brazilian credit market
expansion. Brazil, in the La Porta-Lopez-Silanes-Shleifer-Vishny tradition,
is a French civil law country, with low creditor protection. Credit markets
are relatively underdeveloped. Recently, however, it has made several eﬀorts
toward a more creditor friendly institutional environment. Courts may be
particularly important in an environment with weak creditor protection,
where other protective institutions, such as laws, are weak or inexistent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the recent evolution
of credit market in Brazil and the chronology of payroll lending, emphasiz-
ing the relevant events, such as the approval in congress of the law regulating
payroll lending for retirees and the judicial decision on the legality of payroll
deductions. Section 5.3 presents the data, and section 5.4 presents the em-
pirical strategy. We argue that the presence of an identical product, except
for deduction in payroll, provides a good control for associating changes in
the institutional environment to market changes in payroll lending. Results
are presented and discussed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Credit Market in Brazil: Recent Evolution and Payroll Lending
In recent years, bank lending experienced a pronounced increase in
Brazil, especially in lending out of banks’ “free lending funds” (those not
earmarked by mandatory programs). Between July 1999 and September
2005, the free loans/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio went from 8.3 per-
cent to 17.1 percent (ﬁgure 5.1). This free loan segment now represents 67
percent of total banking credit, changing positions with directed credit op-
erations, that now stands at 33 percent.7
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7. Numbers for December, 2005. Banking credit portfolios in Brazil have two types of
loans: free market operations, where banks can set quantity and prices according to their
proﬁt maximizing behavior; and compulsory directed credit operations, mostly channeled to
housing and rural sectors at subsidized interest rates.Interestingly, this tendency of ﬁnancial deepening took place during a
period of tight monetary policy.8 Despite this fact, free market lending ex-
panded remarkably. Several factors help explain this trend.
These speciﬁc factors are all linked to institutional reforms that took
place in Brazil since the end of 1999. Measures included eﬀorts to reduce
information asymmetries in credit markets (such as the new credit ranking
and provisioning regulation, through Resolution 2.682/99, and the Central
Bank Credit Information System (SCR), implemented in 1999 and im-
proved in 2000 and 2004); more eﬃcient instruments of collateral recogni-
tion and contract enforcement (as the so-called Cédula de Crédito Ban-
cário, a claim with faster execution procedures, in 2001 and 2004;9 a better
insolvency resolution system (through a new bankruptcy law, approved by
Congress in the end of 2004); and regulation of creative credit instruments,
such as payroll lending. They provided an improved institutional environ-
ment and possibly led to the observed higher volumes of credit concessions
by the Brazilian banking sector. As suggested in the previously cited liter-
ature, the evolution toward a more creditor friendly environment might
have engendered this initial movement of ﬁnancial deepening in Brazil.
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8. Brazil adopted inﬂation target and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes in 1999 during a liq-
uidity crisis, exchange rate devaluation, and inﬂation pressure. Interest rates were the main in-
strument used to stabilize the economy. Inﬂation targets are set by Nacional Monetary Coun-
cil, and basic interest rates are deﬁned monthly by Central Bank in Monetary Policy
Committee (COPOM) meetings.
9. The SCR brings detailed information on borrowers’ credit contracts of over R$5,000.00
(roughly US$2,200.00).
Fig. 5.1 Private bank credit/GDP ratio, 1999 to 2005Nevertheless, this rapid expansion path—more pronounced during the
last two years—is not observed in all credit market segments. On the con-
trary, this acceleration is mainly explained by growing volumes of con-
sumer lending. Credit to this segment, which in 1999 represented 3.6 per-
cent of GDP (or 9 percent of total private bank credit portfolio), reached
outstanding volumes that amount to 8.7 percent of GDP in 2005 (or 31
percent of total private bank credit portfolio). Consequently, since De-
cember 2004, personal loans became the biggest part of total bank loans,
with an even higher participation than industrial credit, that has been
stable around 6.9 percent of GDP (ﬁgure 5.2).
Consumer credit loans in Brazil can be divided into three main types of
loans: the personal loan, for consumption purposes; loans for vehicle ac-
quisition; and Cheque Especial, a consumer overdraft facility. It is, however,
in the personal loan category—the largest category, that a major growth is
observed (52 percent during the last twelve months), as shown in ﬁgure 5.3.
This paper is concerned with personal loans, which are further divided
into two subcategories: the standard loan contract (hereafter standard
loan), and a special type of personal loan contract that has an automatic
monthly payment deducted from the borrower’s salary. This is the payroll
lending operation (Crédito Consignado em Folha de Pagamento, hereafter
payroll loan), which represents over 35 percent of all consumer credit in
Brazil and whose growth path has shown a particularly noticeable increase.
Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of payroll lending operations and its in-
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Fig. 5.2 Evolution of private bank credit as a percentage of GDP, by 
economic sectorcreasing participation on total personal loans for the thirteen largest active
banks in this segment.10
Payroll lending has existed in Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s. It
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10. Brazilian Central Bank collects this data for this small—but representative—sample of
banks since January 2004. It now aims to expand it to all banks operating with this speciﬁc
type of credit.
Fig. 5.3 Evolution of consumer lending in Brazil, by category
Fig. 5.4 Evolution of payroll loans, absolute and as proposition of total 
personal loanswas restricted to government personnel and was originally operated by pe-
culium institutions, which had the possibility to act as trusts before public
administration agencies.11 But since the second half of the 1990s, some ﬁ-
nancial institutions identiﬁed in this type of loan a good business oppor-
tunity, with low credit risk and high return. Those banks entered this credit
market through the acquisition of peculium institutions already registered
as trustees.
5.2.1 Payroll Loans: Description of the Product, Chronology 
of Events, and Practitioners’ Opinions
The decisive expansion of payroll lending operations occurred in Sep-
tember 2003, when the government sent to Congress a provisory law (Me-
dida Provisória [MP] 130), subsequently turned into Law 10.820/03.12 The
law regulated the possibility of salary consignation for private-sector for-
mal workers and for retired workers from private sector and pensionaries
covered by the National Institution of Social Security (INSS).13
In practice, payroll deduction turns future income into a collateral. Ev-
idently, future income is valuable as a collateral insofar as it is not too
volatile. This is precisely why payroll lending is mainly used by the follow-
ing three types of borrowers. Before the 2003 law extended regulation to
private-sector retirees, banks lent to public servants, which have employ-
ment stability. Banks then started operating with private-sector workers,
but in association with the labor unions and employers. Contracts are col-
lective, which mitigates idiosyncratic income risk. Finally, after the De-
cember 2003 law, banks started operations with retirees from the private
sector, which also have a constant income ﬂow. The main risk lenders face
is death, which is diversiﬁable and insurable.
Lenders, however, face another peril: judicial risk. Collateral has value
only if courts recognize it as such. Payroll lending in Brazil provides an ex-
cellent empirical setting to assess judicial risk. In 2002, a public servant of
the city of Porto Alegre (the capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul) sued
Banco Sudameris claiming the payroll deduction on his salary was illegal.14
A state-level court (Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul) ruled for the
plaintiﬀ. The decision did not draw much attention for two reasons. First,
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11. Law 8.112/90 admits the possibility of payroll consignation for government personnel.
12. Medida provisória is a legislative device in which the executive sends a bill to congress
that is eﬀective immediately, pending approval. It has an urgency status that forces the legis-
lator to appreciate its merit. For practical purposes, it is almost equivalent to a full-blown law.
13. The Brazilian pension system, a pay-as-you-go scheme, is publicly managed by the
INSS.
14. The deduction was R$58.66 (roughly US$22 by then) to cover amortization and inter-
est expenses on a R$1.015 loan. The precise claim was that wages are essential for subsistence
and therefore cannot be pawned. Furthermore, the monthly nominal interest rate of 3.8 per-
cent was ruled “abusive.” See Valor Econômico 07/02//2004. For the actual decision, see the
STJ Web site at http://www.stj.gov.br.by that time, payroll lending was not such an important credit instrument.
Second, the decision did not set a precedent, once it was related to a claim
that started before the 2003 law, and had been ruled by a state-level court.
Sudameris appealed to the second highest ranking federal court in the
country, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ).15 In late June 2004, the
STJ upheld the regional court ruling. Although technically this decision
also did not set precedent on the issue, it could signal the direction of fu-
ture rulings.16 In this case, the future income collateral could become use-
less. At the time, Minister Edson Vidigal, from the STJ, declared that
“[when] analyzed through the salary perspective, the consignation can be
suspended,” and “[banks] might have to search for alternative forms of
guarantees.”17
Statements by some key practitioners suggest that banks perceived this
as a hazard to their payroll loans operations. Right after the decision, the
Chief of Judicial Operations of Federação Brasileira de Bancos (FEBRA-
BAN, the main bankers’ association), Johan Albino Ribeiro, declared to
the press that “undoubtedly there will be a repercussion in terms of higher
interest rates” since “[one] of the elements that sustain the low interest
rates is the low risk on these loans. If the legality of the contract is con-
tested, the risk increases.”18 Luis Marinho, then the head of Central Única
dos Trabalhadores (UT), the main workers’ union, reported that he had re-
ceived phone calls from several bankers informing “[that] banks would hit
the break on new loans, at least temporarily, until they have a better un-
derstanding of the extension of the STJ decision.”19
However, whether banks indeed reacted to the decision in an economi-
cally meaningful way is not obvious. Indeed, it was not even clear whether,
legally, the court ruling would have a lasting eﬀect. As it was noted, the
decision only applied to one speciﬁc claim, related to a public servant and
which took place before the December 2003 formal regulation. Therefore
the STJ decision could not, technically set precedent for future lawsuits.
Several banking lawyers thought the law regulating payroll loans (Law
10.820/03) was crystal clear.20 In this sense, all the decision could signal
was the courts’ mood toward payroll loans. Furthermore, banks could
have simply ignored it. Indeed, Gabriel Jorge Ferreira (a former head of
FEBRABAN), from UNIBANCO (the third largest private bank in
Brazil), declared that “[the program] is still intact, and I do not think there
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15. Hierarchically, the STJ stands between the STF (Supremo Tribuinal Federal), the
equivalent of the American Supreme Court, and the TFJs (Tribunais Federais de Justiça), the
equivalent to the American Federal Circuit Courts.
16. The STJ rulings are case speciﬁc and do not set precedent.
17. See Gazeta Mercantil, July 16, 2004.
18. See Valor Econômico, July 2, 2004.
19. Mr. Marinho would later be appointed Minister of Labor. See Universo Online, July 4,
2004, http://an.uol.com.br/2004/jul/04/0eco.htm.
20. See Valor Econômico, July 2, 2004, August 13, 2004.will be an upward pressure in interest rates.”21 Indeed, this is precisely our
object of study: whether there is evidence that this judicial hazard had a
first-order impact on market performance. In our application, an aﬃrma-
tive answer would be even more meaningful given the ambiguity of both the
(practical) legal consequences of the ruling and the bankers’ reactions. As
ﬁgure 5.4 shows, it is clear that the court ruling has not prevented the recent
growth of payroll loans. There is, nonetheless, a couple of interesting con-
trafactual questions left to ask. Absent the decision, would this growth have
been more pronounced? Would terms be better (i.e., lower interest rates)?
5.3 Data
Using original data from the SCR, we constructed a data set on payroll
and standard loans. For both types of credit contracts, we have bank-level
monthly data over a period starting in January 2003 and ending in May
2005. There is, initially, data for 109 active banks on outstanding volumes
of payroll and standard personal lending operations. We have bank-level in-
formation on the total amount of loans, average risk rating, average inter-
est rate, number of credit contracts, and average size of the creditcontract.22
The data has information on loan contracts above R$5,000 (US$2,270).
An average sized contract is R$84,719 (US$38,508). This strongly indi-
cates that contracts in the data are mainly indirect, that is, with entities
such as labor unions and governmental agencies, which intermediate the
negotiation, and afterwards refer the bank to their employees or mem-
bers. Contracting directly with individuals began mostly after the De-
cember 2003 law, which regulated payroll lending to private-sector re-
tirees. Because it took at least another ﬁve months for a signiﬁcant group
of banks to be chartered by the INSS, the fact that these loans do not show
in our data is relatively immaterial.23
In order to keep consistency among observations, banks had to satisfy
several criteria to be part of the ﬁnal sample used. First, only banks that
consistently operated in both credit products were included. This avoids
picking up unrelated (to the court ruling) entry and exit decisions, which
are but noise for our purposes. Only banks that supplied both standard and
payroll loans for the whole January 2004 to December 2004 period were 
included. Second, banks that had inconsistent pricing behavior were ex-
cluded. For example, several banks had annual nominal interest rates at 12
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21. See Universo Online, July 4, 2004, http://an.uol.com.br/2004/jul/04/0eco.htm.
22. Interest rate is weighted by the volume of new concessions at each risk category. Credit
risk rating goes from 1 (or AA operations: less risk) to 10 (or HH operations: maximum risk),
following provisioning and classiﬁcation criteria set by Nacional Monetary Council regu-
lation.
23. The December 2003 law required the bank to be chartered by the INSS in order to
supply payroll lending to private-sector employees. The ﬁrst bank to be charted was the Caixa
Econômica Federal (a federal government bank), in May 2004.percent, which are clearly out of line with the rest of the market. Twelve
percent operations are either reporting errors or special loans such as those
to own employees, which we conjecture to have a diﬀerent risk assessment
nature. Other banks had inconsistent structural breaks on the interest rate
series.24 Finally, it is not clear whether government-owned banks (both
state and federal) have the same objective function as their private counter-
parts. The literature is ambiguous with this respect. Although some works
suggest that there is no evidence that public owned banks are less eﬃcient
than the private counterparts (Altubas, Evans, and Molyneux 2001), there
is little controversy over their diﬀerent lending behavior (Sapienza 2002).
And, for Brazil, even if government-owned banks had the same objective
function as private banks, payroll loans is an important piece of policy for
the current federal government, and federally owned banks might be re-
sponding to public policy rather than maximizing proﬁts regarding payroll
loans.25 For these reasons, government-owned banks were excluded.
After these adjustments, the sample consists of forty banks, represent-
ing 67.8 percent of total payroll lending volumes as of May 2005. The
sample includes four out of the ﬁve major private Brazilian banks.
5.4 Empirical Strategy
The opinions voiced by market participants in the press suggest the three
economic variables that might have been aﬀected by the June 2004 STJ rul-
ing: risk assessment, the pricing of loans, and the amount lent. The empir-
ical strategy consists in comparing the evolution, over a period of time that
contains the ruling, of two products: payroll and standard loans. The
diﬀerence in their evolution over the period is interpreted as the causal
eﬀect of the STJ decision, as in any diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model.
5.4.1 The Control Group
As mentioned in section 5.2, although payroll lending has existed since
1990, only in December 2003 was legislation regulating its application to
private-sector formal workers and retirees and pensionaries of social secu-
rity passed. Moreover, only since January 2003 have we had available—
and good quality—split data on payroll and standard personal loans.
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24. It is important to emphasize that we identiﬁed some problems with the interest rate vari-
able in SCR data set. For this reason, we are less conﬁdent about the interest rate results than
the other results presented in section 5.5. The SCR regulation states that interest rates must
be reported on a yearly basis. Nevertheless, not only do inconsistent numbers such as zero or
very low rates abound but also rates that seem to be monthly or contract period based sys-
tematically appear. Those observations were discarded.
25. Nonproﬁt maximizing behavior should not come as a surprise in Brazil when analyzing
public banks’ portfolios. Banco do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), the two
largest government-owned banks are, respectively, the major players in rural and housing
subsidized credit. Banco do Brasil’s outstanding rural credit portfolio represents 52 percent
of all directed and subsidized rural credit in Brazil. The CEF, as of January 2005, accounted
for 42 percent of total subsidized housing ﬁnance operations in Brazil.The object of interest is a supply eﬀect: has the court decision shifted the
supply of payroll loans? We do not, however, pursue the strategy of search-
ing for exogenous variation to estimate the supply directly. As it will be-
come clear in the following, a reduced-form object is estimated for price,
risk, and quantity. The strategy consists of using standard personal loans
as a control group. This way, one can gauge the eﬀect of the court decision
above and beyond unobserved concurrent factors that might have aﬀected
both the demand and supply of payroll loans.26
Standard personal loans are a reasonable control group for payroll per-
sonal loans. The two products are the same, with the exception of the pay-
roll deduction.27 That is, both products are personal lending operations,
consumption oriented, and have no formal collateral or real guarantee at-
tached to them. Finally, because standard loans do not have payroll de-
duction, they were not directly aﬀected by the June 2004 court ruling.
A fair question is why standard loans exist at all given the presence of an
apparently superior very similar credit instrument. As a matter of regula-
tion, payroll loans were conﬁned to special classes of borrowers up until
the December 2003 law and the subsequent chartering of banks to provide
these loans on a more general basis.28In particular, it could be the case that
public-sector employees were signiﬁcantly more present in payroll vis-à-vis
standard loans. This, however, does not seem to be the case, especially for
our speciﬁc sample: payroll lending with the observed average size consists
of both private-sector employees (through agreements with private com-
panies or professional associations) and public servants.
While diﬀerences in the composition of the pool of borrowers is not a
threat to our identiﬁcation strategy, whether these two pools of borrowers
changed diﬀerently over the sample periodis. There are two reasons why this
does not seem to be the case. First, the main change in composition of 
the pool of borrowers occurred during 2005, when banks started getting
chartered by the Social Security Agency to lend to private-sector retirees.
Therefore, there were no signiﬁcant changes in the compositions of the
pool of borrowers in the two groups. Second, economic conditions could
have changed diﬀerently for the two groups, holding constant the compo-
sition of both pools. This would happen if, for instance, the public sector
was downsizing at the time or if the private formal sector was experiencing
a particularly turbulent period. Neither was the case.
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics on the variables that are used as re-
gressands in the following analysis. As expected, the average interest rate is
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26. We do not have overall demand shifters, that is, exogenous variation to estimate the
supply, let alone product speciﬁc (to payroll loans, for instance) demand shifters. For ex-
ample, there is no compelling economic reason why seasonality (a candidate) would aﬀect
payroll loans diﬀerently than standard loans.
27. As a matter of regulatory taxonomy, standard and payroll loans are two subcategories
of personal loans.
28. See section 5.2.lower in payroll than in standard loans: the instruments are very similar,
and the former has wages as collateral. Similarly, standard loans are
riskier, which is consistent with a higher voluntary—and involuntary—de-
fault probability. The amount lent in payroll loans is higher than in stan-
dard loans and has increased more pronouncedly over the sample period.29
When one compares the summary statistics for the control and treat-
ment groups, a few points emerge. First, for payroll loans, both interest rate
and risk were slightly higher than average on the subperiod before the
court ruling. For standard loans, the interest rate was below average, and
risk was slightly above average. This is important for our purposes as the
diﬀerent types of loans could be, on the months before the ruling, on diﬀer-
ent parts of a mean-reversing process. This does not appear to be the case,
and, if anything, interest rates should tend to increase more (decrease less)
for standard loans, vis-à-vis payroll loans, if a mean-reversing force is op-
erative. It is similar for risk.
As for amount lent, one can see, from both table 5.1 and ﬁgure 5.4, an
increase in both categories over the period, with a more pronounced in-
crease for payroll loans. The two categories are following, over time, diﬀer-
ent paths, which could lower the value of standard loans as a control group.
However, if anything, the pronounced upward trend in payroll loans would
make it particularly diﬃcult to document a decrease in payroll loans, rela-
tive to standard loans.
168 Ana Carla A. Costa and João M. P. De Mello
29. For the thirteen banks of the sample mentioned in section 5.2, granting of payroll loans
increased by 66.7 percent during the last twelve months. Outstanding volumes more than
doubled during the same period, while total personal loans increased by 50.1 percent (Nota
Economica para Imprensa [NEI] and Banco Central do Brasil [BCB] 2005).
Table 5.1 Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation
Subsample Subsample 
Whole (month  >12 Whole (month  >12 
period and <18) period and <18)
Average interest rate (% points)
Treatment: Payroll 45.07 46.08 12.21 8.80
Control: Standard 56.67 53.93 24.62 26.05
Total amount of loans (R$)
Treatment: Payroll 6.83E+07 5.93E+07 1.38E+08 1.13E+08
Control: Standard 6.54E+07 5.90E+07 1.43E+08 1.19E+08
Average risk (from categories 1 to 10)
Treatment: Payroll 2.51 2.63 0.55 0.66
Control: Standard 3.17 3.31 0.99 1.13
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Notes:Subsample of forty banks included in the regression analysis. Market averages, weighted by bank
size of operations, except for total amount of loans.5.4.2 The Speciﬁcations
The interest rate and the quantity models are quite similar. An observa-
tion is a product i, oﬀered by a bank b, at a month t. There are two prod-
ucts, personal credit with and without payroll automatic debit deduction.
Let DECISION be a categorical variable that assumes the value 1 for July
2004 and all later months. It denotes the treatment period.30 PAYROLL is
a categorical variable that assumes the value 1 if the product is personal
loan with payroll deduction. It identiﬁes the treatment group. The esti-
mated model for the interest rate is
  log (INTEREST)itb    0    1PAYROLLitb    2DECISIONt
   3DECISIONt   PAYROLLit
   MONTHt   Controls   εitb.
INTERESTibtris the average interest rate on all loans given by bank b on
product i, at month t. The panel unit is a pair bank product. We are inter-
ested in the level of log eﬀect, but the data is ﬁrst-diﬀerenced to eliminate
ﬁxed eﬀects of the pair bank product. Controls include the log of the aver-
age risk on the banks’ portfolios, the (lagged) total number of loan opera-
tions, and the (lagged) average size of the loan operations. Risk is included
for obvious reasons as it should determine interest and is aﬀected by the de-
cision. Total number of loans is included because, as we have seen, payroll
and nonpayroll loans have diﬀerent rates of expansion over the sample pe-
riod. Because expansion might aﬀect the quality of the loan portfolio, the
total number of operations should be controlled for. The average size of op-
erations is included as it is conceivable that banks reacted to the judicial
decision by decreasing exposure on operations by decreasing their size.
The main parameter of interest is  3, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃ-
cient. If the judicial decision had an impact on banks’ pricing of payroll
loans, then  3 should be positive. We run a ordinary least squares (OLS)
procedure on this equation, with the two modiﬁcations. First, we weight
observations by the size of banks’ operations on payroll and standard
loans to arrive at an average market response. Second, we correct for
between-panel correlation and within-panel autocorrelation.
The model can be viewed as a reduced form in which prices (in this case
interest rates) are regressed on exogenous variables. As in any reduced
form, there could be supply (which is of interest) and demand eﬀects (not
of interest) on the parameters. After controlling for period speciﬁc eﬀects,
estimates should be clean of most demand eﬀects, and  3, the main coeﬃ-
cient of interest, should capture a supply response to the ruling. Note that,
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30. Rigorously, the decision took place in June 2004. It was, however, at the very end of the
month (the 28th), so banks only had time to react to it in July. Therefore, all estimated mod-
els consider the treatment period to start in July 2004.precisely to mitigate capturing demand eﬀects, we lag variables such as to-
tal operations and average operations.
The quantity model is similar except that we do not control for the total
number of operations and the average size of operations. These variables
are excluded because the dependent variable, TotalLoans, is the product of
average size and number of loans and therefore would unduly capture most
of the variation in TotalLoans. With the model in logs, in fact, OLS will
make both coeﬃcients equal to one and report an R2 of 1.
  log(TotalLoans)itb    0    1PAYROLLitb    1DECISIONt
   3DECISIONt   PAYROLLit
   MONTHt   Controls   εitb
The main control now is the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the log of average risk on
the banks’ portfolio. Again, the main parameter of interest is  3, the diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient. If banks reacted to the judicial decision by
restricting quantity, then  3 should be negative. We estimate the parame-
ters by an OLS and an instrumental variables (IV) procedure. Diﬀerent
from the interest rate equation, there is empirical reason to believe the lag
of the dependent variable belongs to the right-hand side, and there is also
reason to believe that there is serial correlation on the error term. In this
case, OLS could produce inconsistent estimates (see Arellano and Bond
1991).31Similar to the interest model, we weight observations by the size of
banks’ operations in personal lending, and standard errors are corrected
for between correlation and within-panel autocorrelation.
For the risk perception model, an observation is a product i, oﬀered by
a bank b, at a month t. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the dependent variable,
RISKibt, is a dummy variable, that assumes the value 1 if the average risk
on product i loans given by bank b at month t is above the median risk for
that bank over the period considered. In the second speciﬁcation, yibtis the
average risk on product i’s loans given the bank b’s at month t. The esti-
mated model is
RISKitb    0    1PAYROLLibt    2DECISIONt    3DECISIONt
  PAYROLLibt   Controls    MONTHt   εibt.
Controlsbitare variables that aﬀect risk (such as average size of loans and
total number of loans). Because in the case when RISK is a dummy, it is
unnatural to ﬁrst diﬀerence the data, so to account for bank-product ﬁxed
eﬀects, we include bank dummies in both speciﬁcations to maintain ho-
mogeneity. With the model in levels, when RISK is the average risk in the
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31. Several economic stories could be told to justify the lag of   log (Total Loans) to be-
long, or not, to the right-hand side of both the interest and the quantity equations. Because
this is not our variable of interest, we take an agnostic empirical approach and evaluate
whether empirically it belongs to the equation and take proper econometric steps to correct
(i.e., look for exogenous variation) if it does.bank portfolio, one has to worry that the lagged dependent variable might
belong to the equation, and the lagged average risk is included.32 When
RISK is a dummy, however, including lagged dummies will unduly absorbs
most variation: unless the dummy oscillates wildly, it replicates itself most
periods, and most variation in the dependent variable is explained by its
lag. It is important to notice that this happens not because of the econom-
ics of the dynamics of riskiness on these loans but by the way the dependent
variable is constructed. Incidentally, this eﬀect is especially pronounced 
if the hypothesis to be tested is true: the dummy should assume lots of 1 val-
ues after the decision and a lot of 0 values before the decision.
Again, the main coeﬃcient of interest is  3, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
coeﬃcient. If the judicial decision had an impact on banks’ risk perception
on payroll loans, then  3 should be positive: risk assessment on payroll
loans increased compared to standard loans. We run a logit procedure on
this equation, again weighting observations by the size of banks’ opera-
tions in personal lending.
Notice that in all models, variation among banks is used. This is crucial
as the main economic decision unit is a bank. Although the judicial deci-
sion hit banks at the same time (DECISIONt does not vary over b), banks
potentially diﬀer in their response to the decision, and this provides varia-
tion to estimate the coeﬃcient of interest. In the end, the response of an av-
erage bank is estimated, with larger banks counting more than smaller ones.
5.5 Results and Discussion
5.5.1 The Risk Equation
We start with the risk equation. In table 5.2, the dependent variable is a
dummy for whether bank b’s average risk on the product operation (stan-
dard and payroll loans) is above the median risk for the whole sample (Jan-
uary 2003 to June 2005). The main hypothesis is tested in column (1). The
sample is restricted to ﬁve months before the decision and ﬁve months after
the decision. The coeﬃcient associated with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
regressor ( 3) is 0.357, and it is quite precisely estimated (it is signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level). This means that, relative to standard loans, the proba-
bility that the operation on payroll loans was above the median risk in-
creased. The model is nonlinear, and there is no immediate way to interpret
“above the median risk” is an economically meaningful way, so it is diﬃ-
cult to evaluate this coeﬃcient quantitatively. One can, however, state that,
qualitatively, risk perception on payroll loans increases in period following
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32. In reason for this is that banks, by pricing risk, might scare oﬀbetter borrowers. Hence,
higher risk today could cause higher risk tomorrow. One has then to worry about dynamic
panel biases (Arellano and Bond 1991). See section on results for more on this.the court decision. The probability of the average risk on the banks’ port-
folio being above the median decreases over the subsample period for both
loans (coeﬃcient on Judicial Decision, –0.391). However, it decreases
much less for payroll deduction loans, only –0.184. Expansion in the num-
ber of operations is associated with less risk (a 1 percent increase in the
number of operations decreases the probability of being above the median
in roughly 15.4 percent), which is likely to indicate that a larger number of
operations (and probably a lower average size) provide better diversiﬁca-
tion, although this result is not robust to diﬀerent subsamples.
Although month-speciﬁc dummies are included, it can always be the
case that, for some unaccounted reason, risk perception was decreasing
less for payroll deduction loans, relative to plain personal loans, and this
had nothing to do with the court ruling. For this reason, we ﬁrst expand the
period under consideration to all months after the law regulating payroll
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Table 5.2 Risk equation: Results 1
Subsample
Month >Feb/04  Month Month >Sep/03  Month
and <Dec/04 >Feb/04a and <July/04a >July/04b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payroll loan –0.184 –0.220* –0.386** 0.153
(0.137) (0.120) (0.176) (0.116)
Judicial decision –0.391*** –0.590***
(0.172) (0.154)
Payroll loan   Judicial decision 0.357*** 0.166
(0.078) (0.128)
Log(number of operations) –0.154** –0.017 –0.309* 0.068
(0.071) (0.050) (0.181) (0.060)
Log(average size operation) 0.071 –0.056** 0.102 –0.020
(0.061) (0.026) (0.157) (0.026)
Dummy robust –0.607*** –0.296*
(0.175) (–0.184)
Payroll loan   Dummy robust (0.122) (0.181)
No. of observations 543 993 626 667
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Notes:Dependent variable: dummy for average risk above median. Logit marginal effects estimates. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. Control group: Loans without payroll deduction. Weighted by size
of banks operation. Bank and month dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect on July/2004
(month 12).
aDummy if month > 13.
bDummy if month > 24.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.loans passed through congress. If the estimated diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
had nothing to do with the judicial decision, one would expect that the es-
timated coeﬃcient on the interaction term to remain somewhat constant.
As one can see in column (2), this is not case. Expanding the sample makes
the “eﬀect” of the judicial decision decrease by half, and it is no longer sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, although the sample is almost twice the size. Addi-
tionally, faux treatment dummies are speciﬁed to check whether the same
pattern occurs if we consider artiﬁcial treatment dates. In column (4), the
fake treatment is month twenty-ﬁve, and the sample is restricted on pur-
pose to exclude the months before the judicial decision. The estimated fake
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient has a reverse sign, and it is well esti-
mated. If anything, the discrepancy between standard and payroll loans
was the opposite for this subsample. Finally, the fake treatment period is
put in month fourteen, and the sample is restricted to months before the ju-
dicial decision (column [3]). Again, the coeﬃcient has the opposite sign,
that is, risk increases in standard loans relative to payroll loans in this sub-
sample with a fake treatment period at fourteen. Most likely, this captures
the eﬀect of the bill regulating payroll loans passing through congress.
Results are similar when risk is measured by the average risk rating on
the banks’ portfolio (see table 5.3). There are two diﬀerences though. First,
we diﬀerence the log of the data to eliminate for ﬁxed eﬀects.33Second, with
average risk rating as the dependent variable, one has to account for the
possibility that the dependent variable has persistence over time. For this
reason, several diﬀerent speciﬁcations are applied. First, an OLS model is
used in which the ﬁrst and second lags of the dependent variable are in-
cluded as explanatory variables. The standard errors of the estimated co-
eﬃcients are corrected for between-panel correlation and within-panel au-
tocorrelation. Again, banks’ risk perception on payroll loans increased
relative to standard loans: the estimated coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences parameters is 0.014, and it is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level
(column [1]). Economically, risk perception increased in payroll loans by
roughly 1.4 percentage points. In column (2), a model for the dynamics of
the errors term is imposed, and the parameters are estimated by a feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure. The results for the parameter
of interest ( 3) are exactly the same.
There is, however, the possibility that there is persistence both in the pro-
cess of the dependent variable and the unobserved factors that aﬀect risk
(the error term). Columns (1) and (2) suggest the second lag of the   log
(Average Risk) does not belong to the equation. Therefore, it arises as a
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33. This is tantamount to controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects and should be the preferred proce-
dure. When the dummy for risk above median is used as a dependent variable, it is not natu-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.natural instrument for   log (Average Risk)t–1 under the identifying as-
sumption the error term has only one period persistence.34Now there is not
enough independent variation to estimate the parameter of interest: the 
p-value of estimation is roughly 13 percent. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
coeﬃcient is, nonetheless, still positive, although with a lower magnitude
(0.009). Columns (4) to (6) present the same robustness checks as in table
5.3. Results and corresponding interpretations are qualitatively similar.
Results could be driven by two factors unrelated to the STJ ruling but
implied by heterogeneity in the dynamics of the treatment and control
groups. First, as table 5.1 shows, standard loans are, as expected, riskier
than payroll loans. If there are general institutional advances in credit mar-
kets during the period and if there are decreasing returns in risk improve-
ment, then one should observe a decrease in riskiness of standard vis-à-vis
payroll loans because the former started at a higher level of risk. However,
if this was the case, one would expect that the same pattern would emerge
for all subsamples of whole period. As columns (3) and (4) in table 5.2 in-
dicate, risk perception on payroll loans decreases vis-à-vis standard loans
in the periods before and after the STJ ruling. The same is true in table 5.3
(columns [5] and [6]).
Second, as ﬁgure 5.4 shows, payroll loans boomed during the period,
possibly due to the approval of the December 2003 law. Expansions might
be risk-increasing, that is, the marginal borrower may be worse than the in-
framarginal ones. If this is the case, the pool of borrowers on payroll lend-
ing would be changing, compared to standard lending, in such a way that
would produce the result regardless of the court ruling. There are, however,
at least two reasons why this story cannot rationalize the results. First, the
number of operations is controlled for. In table 5.3, for example, changes
in the log of average risk are explained by the court ruling with variation
above and beyond changes in log of number and average size of operations.
Indeed, because the model is in ﬁrst diﬀerences, results are not only con-
trolled for the fact that larger banks might have lower risk borrowers, but
also for within-bank expansions of payroll vis-à-vis standard operations.
Second, the same argument as in the last paragraph applies. Figure 5.4
shows that payroll operations rose, relative to standard ones, throughout
the period. Hence, if the changing pool of borrowers argument would ap-
ply, one should verify the same increase in riskiness of payroll vis-à-vis
standard operations throughout the period. As columns (3) and (4) in table
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34. Exactly because the second lag does not appear to be a explanatory variable, using fur-
ther lags as instrument would not be warranted because they do not arise naturally as shifts
to the endogenous variable that are not related to the unobserved determinants of risk per-
ception (the error term). As with any identifying assumption, it is impossible to verify it em-
pirically. Because the data is in the ﬁrst diﬀerence of logs, there is no compelling reason why
adjustments to unobserved shocks to risk would take more than a month to be incorporated
to the banks’ credit rating decision.5.2 and columns (5) and (6) in table 5.3 show, this does not seem to be the
case.
5.5.2 The Quantity Equation
The results for the quantity equation are presented in tables 5.4 and 5.5.
Column (1) of table 5.4 presents the simplest possible model: OLS omit-
ting   log (Amount of Loans)t–1 as an explanatory variable and no period
dummies. As expected, operations of payroll loans are larger (6.5 percent
more), and quantities of both standard and payroll loans appear to be in-
creasing over time (coeﬃcient on Judicial Decision, 3.8 percent on average
in the subperiod between February 2004 and October 2004), as ﬁgure 5.4
suggested. Despite the markedly diﬀerent slopes of standard and payroll
loans, the judicial decision did have a negative eﬀect on payroll loans: rel-
ative to standard loans, payroll loans decrease when one compares before
and after the court ruling. Indeed, after controlling for average risk, pay-
roll loan quantities decreased 5.8 percent, between the ﬁve-month sub-
period before the court ruling and the ﬁve-month subperiod after the rul-
ing. Inclusion of period dummies hardly changes the results (column [2]).
Results are, however, slightly diﬀerent when the lag of the dependent vari-
able is included: one can see (column [3]) that part of the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences coeﬃcient was capturing some variation of the   log (Amount
of Loans)t–1. Results, however, remain considerably similar.
The presence of the lag of the dependent variable poses again the chal-
lenge of searching for exogenous variation to estimate the coeﬃcient asso-
ciated with   log (Amount of Loans)t–1 as there could also be persistence
on the error term. Again, we follow the strategy of using the second lag ( 
log [Amount of Loans]t–1) as an instrument. Columns (4) and (5) of table
5.4 present the results. It does appear that part of the estimated coeﬃcient
in columns (1) to (3) are unduly capturing variation due to omission of ex-
planatory variables (which are in the dynamics of the error term). The
eﬀect, however, still survives: in the most unfavorable speciﬁcation, there is
3.7 percent diﬀerence in the trends of standard and payroll loans when pe-
riods before and after the court ruling is considered. This result is not ter-
ribly well estimated, but one could reject the null that it is zero at the 5.8
percent level (column [5]).
Table 5.5 presents diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In columns (1) and (3), stan-
dard error estimates are corrected for between-panel correlation and
within-panel autocorrelation. Notice that the estimates of the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences parameters are even more precisely estimated. When a
FGLS procedure is used, results are similar (column [2]). These results do
not account for the possible omitted variable bias due to the presence of  
log (Amount of Loans)t–2 but do suggest that the statistical signiﬁcance in
table 5.4 is not due to underestimation of standard errors. Column (4) of
table 5.5 checks the robustness of the results in the same spirit as in tables
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.5.2 and 5.3: it appears that the estimated diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃ-
cient is not due to a long-term pattern over the whole sample period. When
the fake treatment period twenty-ﬁve is used and the sample is restricted to
after the court ruling, the results disappear. Similar robustness results hold
for the whole period and for only the period before the court ruling.
5.5.3 The Pricing Equation
The eﬀect of the court ruling on the interest rates of payroll loans can be
found in table 5.6. A couple of comments are necessary. Diﬀerent from the
quantity regression, the number of operations and the average size of the
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Table 5.5 Quantity equation: Results 2
Subsample
Month >Feb/04 Month >Feb/04  Month >Feb/04 Month 
and <Dec/04a and <Dec/04b and <Dec/04a July/04c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔLog(amount of loans)t – 1 0.222 0.150*** 0.189
(0.118) (0.054) (0.182)
Payroll loan 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.036*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
Judicial decision 0.035** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.019)
Payroll loan   Judicial decision –0.051*** –0.053** –0.052***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018)
ΔLog(average risk) 0.033 0.067 0.003 –0.082
(0.144) (0.093) (0.151) (0.103)
ΔLog(average risk)t – 1 –0.280** –0.273*** –0.278* –0.161*
(0.141) (0.093) (0.154) (0.098)
Dummy robust 0.020
(0.021)
Payroll loan   Dummy robust 0.015
(0.034)
Date dummy? No Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 507 507 507 665
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Notes: Dependent variable: ΔLog(amount of loans). OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Control group: Loans without payroll deduction. Probability-weighted by size and bank opera-
tion. Bank dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect on July/2004 (month 18).
aStandard error of estimated coefﬁcients corrected for between panel correlation and within panel au-
tocorrelation using the Praiss-Winsten procedure.
bFeasible generalized least squares (FGLS) assuming errors within panels follow an AR(1) process.
cDummy robust = 1, if month > 18, most favorable model: FGLS assuming errors within panels follow
an AR(1) process.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.operation are included. We do so because there might be (dis)economies of
scale involved in granting loans. Both variables are lagged one period to
mitigate the possibility of capturing demand side eﬀects. Second, it is im-
portant once again to emphasize that the data on prices is problematic, es-
pecially for interpretation on levels. Taking the log and ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
the data ameliorate somehow the problems with levels but do not solve it.
Interpretation on changes, however, is less troublesome, and we proceed by
doing so, especially as the results with interest rates are consistent with the
results on quantities and risk perception.
Column (1) of table 5.6 shows the OLS results when the lag of the de-
pendent variable is included, but not the period dummies. Consistent with
the quantity and risk perception results and with the perception of im-
portant market participants, the court ruling appears to have induced an
increase in the interest rate charged on payroll loans. After controlling 
for number of operations, average size of operations and risk, there is a
marked diﬀerence (7.3 percent) between the trends of interest rates on pay-
roll and standard loans before and after the court ruling. Consistent with
the general perception in the market, interest rates on payroll loans are
lower than those on standard loans (6.3 percent). Estimates suggest risk
perception does indeed aﬀect interest rate as expected: while one cannot
reject the null hypothesis that contemporaneous changes in risk perception
aﬀect interest rates, one-period lagged increases in risk perception does in-
duce an increase in prices of loans. After standard errors of estimation are
corrected for between-panel correlation and within-panel serial correla-
tion, the lag of the dependent variable does not appear to belong to the
equation. This renders results less vulnerable to dynamic panel bias.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) of table 5.6 present slightly diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions. Most noteworthy is column (3), in which the OLS standard errors of
estimation are not corrected. Here, one cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there are not diﬀerences between standard and payroll loans with re-
spect to the court ruling. The estimates suggest that correction on the stan-
dard deviation provides better (more precisely) estimates for the diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerences parameter. Column (5) of table 5.6 presents the same
robustness check as in all other tables, and it is again consistent with the
previous results.
5.6 Conclusion
The results in this paper suggest the conjecture of some market partici-
pants that the June 2004 court ruling had an adverse eﬀect on the market
performance of payroll loans. Results arise and are consistent among each
other for risk perception, quantity of loans, and interest rates, with the
data caveat for the latter. Data suggests that the ruling increased risk per-
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increase interest rates.
These results are far from obvious. Several key market players antici-
pated them, but not all. It could have been that lenders had ignored the rul-
ing. As ﬁgure 5.4 eloquently suggests, the court ruling did not prevent the
boom of payroll loans. It did, however, abate it, and made it such that terms
to borrowers were worse.
This paper provides some evidence on the missing link of the institu-
tions-economic performance nexus literature: the micro evidence. Far
from contradicting the literature, our results corroborate it with evidence
drawn from the unit of decision making: lenders in this case. It reinforces
the policy recipes already implied by the literature. Better protection from
expropriation most likely increases general welfare, as it improves market
performance in informationally and incentive problematic markets, such
as the credit market.
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Comment Renato G. Flôres Jr.
This paper deals with an interesting problem, relevant both to the theo-
retical debate and to policy setting, the latter not only in present day Brazil.
Though the authors’ views on the theoretical impact of their results are
somewhat enthusiastic, their eﬀort to resort to microdata is most welcome,
as well as the use of recent, program evaluation econometric techniques in
a (micro) ﬁnance context. My comments will concentrate on this last point
as, unfortunately, in spite of its virtues, the paper leaves several unanswered
questions as regards methodological and econometric aspects related to
their use of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimation technique.
First, however, I’m obliged to come to a minor point. The paper is not
very friendly to someone who wants to understand what has actually been
done. Diﬀerent time lengths seem to have been used for the computations,
labeling the months by ordinals is confusing (to my surprise, July 2004 is
18, not 19 . . . ), equations aren’t numbered (“controls” are mentioned af-
ter each equation), ﬁgures have poor labeling, and the technical explana-
tions suﬀer from a few black holes.
Ideally, as known, the methodology of the DD estimator requires per-
fect matching between the two populations, but for the treatment, and
clearly deﬁned before and after treatment periods. The matching popula-
tion to the payroll loans (PLs) one was that of standard loans, and, not-
withstanding the reasoning in section 5.4.1, it is not evident that, but 
for the July 2004 ruling, both populations suﬀered the same inﬂuences.
Without entering into the more conceptual issue that the two types of bor-
rowers—the ultimate observational unit—are probably very diﬀerent in
socioeconomic terms and so don’t match, even accepting loans as the ob-
servational unit, questions arise: Were there not other, speciﬁc shocks to
standard loans? What is the percentage of movers between the two popu-
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Renato G. Flores Jr. is Professor in the Graduate School of Economics, Fundação Geteulio
Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.lations, especially given the diﬀerent stages in PL implementation? Per-
haps the answers are on the safe side, but the authors should elaborate
more on them. This point is enhanced by the fact that the ﬁnal sample of
banks may easily be biased, and statistics on the structure of the sample are
rather incomplete.
Turning to the before and after periods, the impact of the ruling may
have had a lag and even an anticipation eﬀect. Combining this with the De-
cember 2003 legislation—also a treatment: the powerful Caixa Econômica
Federal started to accept individual PLs in May 2004—better support and
evaluation is needed for the two periods chosen.
As for the econometrics itself, monthly diﬀerences—justiﬁed on the
grounds of eliminating idiosyncratic eﬀects in the panel at stake—are used
for the dependent variable in the interest rate and total loans cases. Then
the linear DD model is directly speciﬁed for such diﬀerences in order to
make possible the inclusion of the three classical, required dummies (oth-
erwise, they would vanish when taking the diﬀerences). This raises inter-
pretation problems not only in the very speciﬁcation of the models—which
proceeds as if the dependent was in levels—but on the meaning of the ulti-
mate DD expectation itself. The same ambiguous treatment applies to the
residuals, though some care is sometimes shown with their correlations. In
this particular, the authors seem oblivious of the issues raised in the key
contribution by Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullanaitan (2004), and I have some
diﬃculty in explaining a series of values like those in table 5. 6, for instance.
In overall terms, the nearly striking results often obtained for the DD co-
eﬃcients—not supported by the informal analysis of stylized facts and
trends—couldn’t be an outcome of underestimated standard deviations as,
beyond other problems, they might have incurred?
I think questioning along these lines qualify the paper as suggestive, but
in order to be trusted certainly demand a more careful and methodologi-
cally attentive text.
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